Saturday, July 31, 2010

Is knowledge justified true belief?

Is knowledge justified true belief?

This paper will demonstrate that the tripartite analysis of knowledge – justified true belief (JTB)– isa solid foundation for the definition of knowledge. Firstly a brief overview of JTB, Gettier-type counter-arguments and three types of response to the Gettier problem: The fourth premise, redefining the definition and scepticism. Than an argument against scepticism with two additional considerations regarding the analysis of knowledge. Firstly, knowledge is relative to the context of
would-be-knower's perception and secondly, the would-be-knower must be aware of limitations to their claims of knowledge. Based on this, it is possible to present a definition of knowledge that is encompassed by justified true belief.

The statement: “I know that it is raining, but I don't believe it” is a contradiction, as knowing encompasses an awareness of truth that assumes belief.1 It is clear that truth and belief are integral to knowledge, however, although true belief is necessary for knowledge it is not sufficient.2 The implication being that epistemological “luck” lacks evidence and thus could not be known to be
true.3 In response to these deficiencies, an alternative analysis of knowledge–justified true belief – emerged proposing that in addition to true belief the believer must have reasoning or good evidence to support the truth of their belief.4 The justified true belief analysis of knowledge can be written:5


S has knowledge of P if and only if:
1. P is true
2. S believes that P is true, and
3. S is justified in believing that P is true



The tripartite analysis of knowledge is frequently attributed to Greek philosopher Plato who wrote about it in his Theaetetus and was widely accepted until 1963 when Edmund Gettier provided two counter-examples in his paper “is justified true belief knowledge?.”6 His examples demonstrated cases that satisfied the conditions of Justified true belief, yet would not be regarded as genuine cases of knowledge because the conditions had only been met “by dumb luck, by accident, by coincidence, or by some means we intuitively regard as illegitimate”7 Most Gettier-type counters follow the same basic form:8

1. S justifiably believes that P
2. P is false
3. S correctly infers: if P is true Q is true
4. S believes Q justifiably
5. Q is true, but not by virtue of P
6. S has a justified true belief that Q


There have been numerous responses to the Gettier problem and this paper will cover three. Firstly, Alvin Goldman's “A causal theory of knowledge” detailing that for a belief to be knowledge there must be a causal connection between the belief and it's truth.9 That is to say that: the truth of P caused S's belief that P” or in Goldman's own words:10

S knows that P if and only if
“The fact P is causally connected in an “appropriate” way with S's believing P.”


Unfortunately Goldman's theory relied on the assumption that all Gettier counters were the result of 2 non-causal, incorrect, inferences.11 Carl Ginet disproved this idea with the now well-known “barnfacade” rebuttal where although the belief satisfied the requirements of causal theory, the believer did not have knowledge.12


Similarly Keith Lehrer and Tomas Paxton suggested the addition of a fourth premise:
“defeasibility.”13 Proposing that a justified true belief is knowledge if and only if no other truth would destroy the justification for the belief.14 That we do not know something if their exists a truth that would defeat it. Although this satisfies common claims of knowledge, if the would-be-knower is not privy to all the relevant information they could be said to not know all the truths that would defeat their belief.

Alternatively, Robert Nozick's “truth-tracking” theory seeks to redefine the JTB analysis of knowledge. Nozick described knowledge as a belief that reliably “tracks the truth”.15 Demonstrating that so long as justification of a belief reliably tracks the truth, it is valid.16 However, the tracking theory can be criticised for giving the status of knowledge to the process of knowledge acquisition, even if there is faulty reasoning.

Confronted with the continual attempts and subsequent difficulties resolving the Gettier problem, Richard Kirkham concluded that the only analysis of knowledge exclusive enough to exclude all Gettier-type counters is one that could not be inclusive of the beliefs we “commonly regard as knowledge.”17 Kirkham conceded that much of what we intuitively regard as knowledge is fallible and thus we cannot know much as even beliefs that seem infallible may not be.18


The justification that a belief is true requires another justified and true belief continuing ad. Infinitum.19 The need to “justify the justification.” forms the infinite regress argument against the tripartite analysis of knowledge. In an attempt to solve the regress problem foundationalist theorise that there are finite steps of justification that are logically reducible to “basic” beliefs that are axiomatic truths.20 Sceptics propose that these “foundational beliefs” are arbitrarily labelled and are not self-evident.21 Descartes provided a particularly compelling sceptical argument, beginning with perception as a foundational belief he constructed three simple counter arguments and systematically destroyed it.


(1)Firstly, Descartes highlighted how perceptions are often mistaken, for example: a straight stick appears bent in the water. However, he readily admitted that we often know when our perceptions are defective and thus we are able to correct perceptual errors.22


(2)Secondly he questioned: If sometimes a dream is mistaken for reality, could it be the case that reality is mistaken for a dream? If “being awake can [not] be distinguished from being asleep” then it can not be known that perceptions are true. Descartes acknowledged that objects in dreams and perceived reality still possessed certain attributes, Namely: they had shape, colour, could be counted and extended through time and in space.23

(3)Thirdly he imagined that there was a malicious demon that constantly and systematically deceived him, manipulating his mind, so that his perception of any external thing was a delusion. From this Descartes concluded that there was only one certain truth that remained: “I think, therefore I am.” That the act of thinking: “I exist” necessitates it's truth, for something must exist to be thinking.24


Although sceptical arguments can be labelled unlikely, irrelevant, void of common sense and guilty of toying with semantics25 it seems somewhat against philosophical enquiry to dismiss them in this way. In fact the sceptic's argument that all knowledge derived from perceptions is fallible, is an acceptable one, as no matter how complete the justification given for a belief the sceptic can continuously ad hoc counter-arguments that bring into question every perceptual connection with what “is.” Yet, the mere possibility of deception is not enough to render the senses as entirely untrustworthy.26 Since, at the very least, there seems to be cognitive interaction with what is being perceived, even if it is a delusion.


Consider the following thought experiment: Samantha is a “brain in a vat” and her entire world is constructed by a team of scientists who provide her with experiences. One such experience is her linear concept of time, such that she knows that while seated in her chair typing at the computer that some time will pass (sitting, chair, typing, computer and time are all of course illusions). So long as she accepts the possibility that her world is a manipulated reality; that she could be asleep, the subject of an evil demon's will or that she is a brain in a vat, which indeed she is. Then she is aware and accepts that she does not know anything outside of what she attains through her perceptions, which entails that her knowledge only pertains to what she has perceived or is perceiving; That her concept of “time” is only knowledge of something she perceives it in her reality. Thus, simply not knowing all the information does not render the perceptions she does have void.27 For indeed she is perceiving something and that leads her to formulate beliefs, those beliefs affect her actions and her actions causally interact with the world she has perceived. So long as her claims of knowledge only pertain to the coherent system of perception, then scepticism poses no threat to her capacity for knowledge.28


Brain in the vat type analogies may seem absurd, however, given that evolution has lead to perceiving the world in a humanised way it is not at all far-fetched to suggest that perception is, at the very least, subjective29 For example, when “seeing a colour” it is the eye's detection of certain wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation.30 In other words, colour, taste, feel and so forth, depend on the perceptual tools of the observer. What “is” only exists in a recognisable form when something exists to recognise it, thus, the perception of what “is” is influenced by the context of the observer.31 If the observer has evolved to understand what “is” through perceptions, language and language-based thought, then from these attributes it is possible to make logical inferences that are labelled as “knowledge.” It seems that scepticism is correct in questioning the “truth” of perception. However it does not follow that there cannot be “knowledge” as some types of knowledge are constructed from perception. Based on this, “knowledge” could be defined as a justified true belief logically deduced from, and coherent with, the plexus of all accessible information that is reducible to sensory input and is accepted provisionally until the discovery of an alternative truth which disproves it. Knowledge should also retain it's “knowledge status” so long as at the time of knowledge acquisition it was a justified true belief. As an item of “knowledge” only ever pertains to the specific combination of information that was present at it's acquisition and thus, remains knowledge when defeated. It is therefore possible to have “false knowledge” that is, knowledge which is no longer relevant to the plexus of information. This view is somewhat pragmatic, with an emphasis on the functionality of knowledge over it's actuality.

Revised definitions of knowledge struggle to demonstrate it's ambiguity and often try to bundle “types” of knowledge into a single analysis despite fundamental differences in their contextualised meanings and function. For example: scientific knowledge, day-to-day knowledge and scepticism, each require unique versions of a justified true belief.32 Thus, the would-be-knower needs to be aware of the limitations to their particular claim of knowledge in order for their justified true beliefs to qualify as a form of knowledge; even though it will not satisfy the requirements of every form of knowledge. However, “S knowing what P pertains to” is not a premise unto itself; if Samantha “knows the flower is red” than there is an unstated awareness that this knowledge only pertains to knowing the perception of redness. Thus, awareness and acceptance of these limitations is implicit to the justified true belief analysis, therefore, justified true belief is an adequate definition of knowledge.



1. Sober, Elliott. Core Questions in Philosophy. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1995.
2. Plato. “Knowledge is Something More Than True Belief.” In Core Questions in Philosophy, 2nd
ed. Edited by. Elliott Sober, 204- 211. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1995.
3. ibid.
4. Philosophy Index. “Tripartite Theory of Knowledge” http://www.philosophyindex.
com/epistemology/knowledge/tripartite.php (accessed july 01, 2010).
5. O'Brien, Dan. The Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.
6. Gettier, Edmund. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23,(1963): 121-123.
7. Kirkman, Richard L. “Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?” Mind, New Series 2, no.
372 (1984): 501-513.
8. Philosophy Index. “Gettier Counterexamples” http://www.philosophyindex.
com/gettier/counterexamples/ (accessed july 01, 2010).
9. Alvin Goldman "A Causal Theory of Knowing" in The Journal of Philosophy v. 64 (1967), pp.
357–372.
10. Ginet, Carl cited by Goldman, Alvin I. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge” The
Journal of Philosophy 73.20 (1976): 771–791. Print.
11. ibid.
12. ibid.
13. Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxton Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief, in The Journal
of Philosophy v. 66 (1969), pp. 225–237.
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Tegan Roberts Mind and World
14. ibid.
15. Nozick, Robert. philosophical explanations Harvard University Press. 1981.
16. Fred dretske "Conclusive Reasons" in Australiasian Journal of Philosophy v. 49 (1971), pp. 1–
22.
17. Kirkman, Richard L. Op. Cit.
18. ibid.
19. Armstrong, D.M. 1973. Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
20. Pence, Gregory. A Dictionary of Common Philosophical Terms. s.v “Foundationalism.” New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2000.
21. Chisholm, Roderick M. Theory of Knowledge. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989.
22. Descartes, RenĂ©. “Mediations on First Philosophy.” from The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, vol. 2. Edited & translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch.
Cambride: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
23. ibid.
24. Descartes, RenĂ©. “Second Mediations” from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 2.
Edited & translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch. Cambride: Cambridge
University Press, 1984.
25. Fogelin, Robert j. “Contextualism and Externalism: Trading in One Form of Skepticism for
Another” Philosophical Issues, vol. 10, 2000, 43-57.
26. Lehrer, Keith. “Knowledge, Coherence and Skepticism” Philosophical Issues, Vol. 2,
Rationality in Epistemology, 1992, 171-192.
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Tegan Roberts Mind and World
27. ibid.
28. ibid.
29. Railton, Peter. “Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief.” Philosophical Issues 5 (1994): 71-
93.
30. Weiten, Wayne. “Sensation and perception” in Psyhology: Themes and Variations, 8th ed.
Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010, 129-184.
31. Railton, Peter. “Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief.” Op. Cit
32. Feder, Kenneth L. Frauds, myths, and mysteries: science and pseudoscience in archaeology.
Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1990: p. 9-26 .
10

More trouble in guild-odise

Okally....


This in in regards to suicide kings and MS/OS rolling. I don't think that having a MS/OS/2nd Chance roll is equitable for 2 reasons.

Firsty, In chat it was suggested that a 'minor upgrade' to MS shouldn't get priority over an OS. I have two concerns with this assesment of the situation.

1. I do not think it is possible to conclude that the item is a 'minor upgrade' simply because they where not willing to use their position to roll on it. In reality it could be anywhere from a minor-high level upgrade and the only conclusion you can draw is that something somewhere else in the raid is 'better' or most-likely 'the -best'

2. I would not suggest that this MS minor-high upgrade should be a greator priority to OS. It is a decision that a player makes to risk a MS item so that they can roll on a more desired item. However I also do not agree with the Idea that "OS should get priority over a minor-high level MS upgrade" It is here I think they draw more or less even.

Taking this into account, up comes my second concern, that this OS > MS minor-high-upgrade is unfair to multi-classes and is open to abuse.

IF I am a dps and I have two dps specs, chances are that I am likely to need very similar gear for both my specs, therefore, If i do not want to roll on an item as MS because I will lose my position (and thus can't roll on a better upgrade) I can make a valid OS roll for it because it is still good for my OS. If you are a multi-class you would not be able to do this, aka DPS plate - heal plate.

And what if there is more then one set for a MS, an 'OS set' for your MS E.g as a healer, you may have 'mp5' heavy items as a second healing set for mana intensive fights. In this case it is a valid OS roll and more to the point how do you decide whom honestly requires the item above somebody else, whom has a genuine claim to an item as OS.

and I can only conclude that those who do not wish to lose their position (and thus the 'best' item) ARE therefore rolling as an OS and thus it should be considered an OS roll.

I wonder if we simply do not like the idea of someone 'playing' their roll/position, but I believe this is an intended part of the suicide kings system and is nothing to be concerned about.

Friday, June 11, 2010

A response to an "ASK" question.

This was probably just a troll, but i still find myself keen to give an answer.

The question:
Why are men better than women?

The Previous answer was:

"Nature gave men the better body, we are taller and stronger. We also don't have to worry about PMS or be careful like women do during pregnancy which means we are ready 24/7/365 and require less maintenance. Even from the way we pee, men can do it easier while for women its more uncomfortable. men have higher toleration to "physical" pain because we have a higher muscle ratio, giving us greater upper body strength. female hip bones are wider apart so they are slower than men at running and more prone to injury in sports
. . ."structurally" men are better. . ." "



Which I really do not think provides a satisfactory answer. The original question presupposes that men are "better" than women, however "better" is used ambigiously here. Certainly we could say things like "Men have strength" but we cannot say this is true of all men, or that it is "better" than many other traits. Likewise comments like "women get PMS" is absurd reasoning, all humans regardless of gender experience mood changes affected by reproductive hormones, both males and females experience these fluctuations. Females often in corrollation with their ovulation/menstration cycle and men often experience mood changes when replenishing sperm "Stocks"(somewhat frequently). But yet again we have nothing to suggest that this is the case for all people and it certainly doesn't bring us closer to deciding if one gender is better than another. Ideas about "maintenance", "pain tolerance" "run speed" are all affected by societal expectations, vary between individual people and do not, by themselves, qualify for an overall "better." The final comment that "structurally men are better" is again absurd, a good question to ask this claim is "better at what?" and does that kind of "better" override the structural benefits of the alternative? Surely the answer is no, built for different purposes perhaps, but you could not draw from this that one is "better."


So... who is "better?" Honestly, neither. This is another case of the human tendancy towards dichotomy. That is we tend to want to divide the "traits" into two non-overlapping categories, in this case "male" and "female." We assign (percieved) characteristics to each group. Unfortunatly power imbalances between the groups can lead to negative traits being assigned more readily to the less-powerfull. Furthermore trait's of the less-powerful group that are not "negative" may be percieved to be negative. This is called class polarisation. In the case of male-female "which is better" debate, these polarisations cloud our judgement and do not help produce a realistic conclusion.

for example:
Strength - Weakness
Aggressive - submissive

To fully understand this you need to take a appropriately critical viewpoint of your current gender expectations, in particular to question their foundations.
In truth individuals are androgynous, that is that they have a fairly even mixture of traits and mental attributes from the two artificial categories. More or less our "tendacy" is incorrect and leads to questions like "why are men better than women."

The physical difference between genders are perhaps the largest true differences. However, despite these differences it is still difficult to define one as "better." In response to the original answer it could be just as easily said that women are more physically flexible than men, often have better fine motor skills and have a longer lifespan (often with less health issues). Of course, just as the generelisations made in the original answer, these do not apply to every women and only represent a slight tendency in the direction of being "better" in those areas. Yet again, we are no closer to defining who is "better" for it seems individuals have a mix of traits and even those traits which do have a gender correlation, it is a tenuous link and no one trait is vastly superior to another.

So my final answer is that men are not "better" than women and likewise women are not "better" than men. There are some patterns of trait strengths in the genders, however they are complimentary, have very little real affect on modern life and one cannot be said to be "better" than another...it is subjective. Most individuals are androgynous and trying to divide the traits into two categories does not do the reality justice.

You could ask "why is it better to be a man" or "why is it better to be a women" The answers are of course subjective opinions and not something as "fact" but it is none the less a fun topic to mess around with :)

Saturday, May 15, 2010

When Did I Notice Gender Rules?

There was a time when I was no more aware or concerned about streotypes and gender roles than I was aware or concerned with the chewy on the underside of my desk. This represents my time in primary school, where exporation of my surroundings was predominatly physical, with little attention given to understanding complex social constructs. Choosing, or perhaps encouraged, to simply float along the river of dreams, the sky as my limit adrift on my proverbial cloud. Wihout doubt these 'social rules' and expectations were having a profound affect on me. Yet as a young child I did not concern myself with these matters and I certainly did not partake in any deep anaytical thought. Things were simple, black and white; For example, if I intended to play sport, I was only aware of the criteria I had to fill to do so. Yet I was completely unaware of why that criteria existed. The resulting effect of this unknown social pressure on my child mind is both intriguing and upsetting. The manner in which I did discover these strict gender expectations leaves me, in many ways, bitter towards the society that promoted them.

The saying "Ignorance is bliss." holds particular relevence for my years in primary school. Blissfully I was unaware of the societal rules that governed my every move. As a child I enjoyed playing rough sport, playing with dinosaurs and fantasy role play. My mannerisms in general would have been seen as more masculine and, as i later discovered, were 'looked down upon'; my gender deviance frequently discouraged and punished by my teachers. The biggest difference between me and those who may have expirianced similar treatment, was my reaction. My child-like mind took this negative feedback and translated it. I honestly began to believe that if I wanted to do the things I enjoyed, these 'masculine' things, then i simply had to be a boy. So I transformed myself, I cut my hair short and wore male clothes, till was indistinguishable from any boy in my year. Yet I was uncomfortable with myself, I would often be asked if I was a boy and I would always reply 'No!' I would make sure they knew that physically I was female. That is to say that my desires to be a boy were purely based on my desires to do masculine things. That a child would intepret signals as a choice, not between activities, but in gender. This situation is a sad representation of society and it is how I came to realise how much affect gender stereotypes and roles have.

Today I am aware and often deep in thought about the origins of these rules, as well as potential 'solutions.' I personally believe that stereotypes are an unmovable aspect of the human psyche, ingrained and inbuilt for their supiriority in efficient communication. I am also certain that attempting to use the legal system to alter societal perspectives is ineffective. It is futile to write laws that dictate what someone's beliefs, it tends to be more effective when it works reactively with large shifts in community thought. However, I am confident that a gradul 'widening' of accepted boundaries for gender could occur, whereby the criteria for important life decisions would not seat gender as a major demoninator. So more weight would be given to a person's individual characteristics and less on the expected characteristics for their gender.

Humans by nature have a mix of characteristics, unfortunatly these have been artificially place into categories based gender. By nature people have a variety of these characteristics, yet they are expected to conform to this warped social standard. This can only be altered with time, a gradual alteration to what we view as important to identity, as society moves away from it's evolutionary origins and continues to develop humanities most advanced trait, Intelligence. The path to heightened sentience will lead to a reduction in reliance on these evolutionary 'throw-backs.' In-turn more weight will be placed on our intellect and this will result in a society where gender has less relevence. Finally, androgyny would be reconised as an individual's natural state, contributing to a greater understanding of oneself and their own unqiue combination of characteristics. This heightened awareness will allow peope to critically view the stereotypes they do make and thus they will be more wiling to accept exceptions to the stereotyped rules.

Friday, March 26, 2010

Asperger's Experience

Most people have experiences the sensation that they are in some way different from others. A person with aspergers experiences this same phenomenon, the same 'AH HA!' but, this is where the similarities cease. For the duration and depth of the asperger's experience extends far beyond this understanding of personal development.

Most people experience persona differences, which are subtle when placed in a social framework. A person with aspergers also has their own distinct combination of traits. However there is a very large difference in how they experience them as a result of the condition.

The eyes of an aspeger's mind operate as though a thick pane of glass separates them from society. As though they are missing some crucial 'sense' a tool to receive and interpret social data. Limiting their capacity to function within the society that they can see.

This strange perception and lack of social understanding can lead to certain personal preference and personal traits. However, it is not the possession of these personality differences that form the aspergers experiences. Since such difference are normal. It is because they cannot possibly exist within the social framework which allows an individual to feel part of a community regardless of comparatively small personality difference. In this way a sufferer is alone in their experience of uniqueness. Though they experience the same sensations hearing/seeing/touching/smelling, they can not function socially and therefore they are effectively isolated, on a separate plane.

It is all too easy to misinterpretation a sufferers struggles as normal teenage personal development. to assume that it is a 'normal' developmental occurrence spreads seeds of doubt in that individuals mind. From behind their eyes how are they meant to know, beyond doubt, that they are not simply within that phenomenon. To know that their reaction to something so standard is so disproportional, that they are foolish. that they are not capable of coping with something that everybody else can. it is a constant source of anxiety and depression for sufferers when their plight against this serious condition is not even recognised. When the result of a suffering they cannot control is placed squarely on their shoulder.

think about that:)

Sunday, March 14, 2010

Pantheism Explained

I am a Naturalistic/Monist Panthiest, literally translates to 'all is god', in a nutshell it is the belief that 'God' is universe(nature) and everything within tha(synonym) and that 'God' is not an entity, creator god and doesn't take any human form.

pantheism is more of a train of thought that appeases a fairly human spirituality desire.

The way I use the term 'God' here is not to suggest a single ultimate 'substance' at all. When I am saying 'God' in the pantheistic context I am not suggesting one single ultimate 'substance' or really at all delving into or making claims about the technicalities of what does and doesn't exist in what context.

I am essentially giving the title of 'God' to 'everything'(in whatever quantity or context it exists in). In doing so I am acknowledging that there are things we do not yet understand, but I am also not attributing them to a supernatural phenomenon.

Some pantheist choose not use the word 'God' at all due to the confusion and ease of misinterpretation. But for me the word 'God' has always been a fitting all encompassing term. This is a really important distinction to make. If you were to apply traditional views about what constitutes a 'God' then it will distort the interpretation of pantheistic thought.

Understandably Pantheism is often referred to as 'jazzed-up atheism.' Although our beliefs about the existence of a supernatural god are certainly in-line. Those who associate with pantheism tends to maintain a strong sense of nature-linked spirituality. It is important to recognise both the similarities and difference between these two thoughts.

I am a pantheist in my thinking. But it is not my pantheism which defines what I must believe about how the world operates in a scientific sense, about existence/boundaries/how life began. the word 'God' applied in this context is fluid and adaptive. As opposed to limiting the scope of what 'is and isn't' before we even begin to explore.

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

AbortSA Rantabulous.

AbortSA?! No! i disagree! South Australia is just as good as any state! i refuse to merge with Victoria!!!! .......Seriously abortsa, Misleading misused statistics and emotive unrealistic crap, Trevor Grace Rosaries off my ovaries /agree!